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Half a year before Japanese pilots bombed the United States into 
World War 11, in a June 1941 edition of Coronet magazine, a little 
known author added his voice to that of other critics of the policies 
of Franklin D. Roosevelt. There were basically only two New Deals, 
John Pritchard here retorted to those who were debating the many 
twists and turns of the administration's policies. As he saw it, there 
had been a visionary and planning-oriented first stage-a "New 
Deal I" -from 1933 to the Nazi push into Holland in May 1940. 
Roughly at that time, however, the first stage had given way to a far 
more hardnosed phase which he labeled "New Deal I1 -the New 
Deal of War." 
If Pritchard's phrase was new, the notion behind it was not. But 
his was and remains the most poignant expression of an attitude 
that for all its impact has never been fully understood. How can it 
be that even if a clear majority of the American people favored all 
steps short of war in the months immediately before Pearl Harbor 
the President hesitated to take the lead ?And how can it be explaineed 
that Washington remained in a state of political turmoil during 
most of the military emergency when other nations at this crucial 
moment set aside politics in a show of real national unity? In  both 
situations, the corrosive influence of the "New Deal of War" idea 
remains crucial. 
In  retrospect, this idea served the function as a bridge uniting the 
peacetime and wartime opposition against Roosevelt. I t  contained 
a conspiratorial theory of war and reform that appeared to make 
both phenomena part of the same administration grand design. As a 
result, the same war which saddened American reformers because 
they regarded it as the final farewell to reform horrified many of 
Roosevelt's opponents precisely because they saw in it the very 
culmination of a New Deal whose essence they believed to be regi- 
mentation. Bizarre though the "New Deal of War" notion may 
strike present-day observers, it was by no means shared only by the 
lunatic fringe. As it had wide currency not only among important 
Republicans in and out of Congress but also among leading Demo- 
cratic dissidents, the term "fringe" is misleading. I t  is high time, 
therefore, to examine somewhat more closely the yeast that fo- 
mented so much frenzied opposition against FDR in the years im- 
mediately before and after Pearl Harbor. 
This entails first of all a closer look at Roosevelt's connection with 
the phenomenon called isolationism. American isolationism in the 
nineteen thirties was no less than a conglomeration of approaches 
and attitudes. I t  was in part a geographic impulse, a sense of com- 
placency nurtured by the fact that the dangerous world was thou- 
sands of miles away. On the other hand, isolationism was in Samuel 
Lubell's words also ethnic and emotional rather than geographical; 
Irish-Americans, German-Americans and Italian-Americans sought 
to keep the United States from committing itself to a policy that 
might harm the interests of their old countries. But perhaps above 
all, isolationism reflected simply the old American viewpoint that 
"Europeans are a different breed of cats from us" and the com- 
panion view that the United States had a special mission in the 
world that it might forfeit by aligning itself with the troubled nations 
directly. As Henry Clay had put it, America must keep the lamp 
burning lightly on the western shore rather than risk extinction 
amid the ruins of falling European republics. Among the major 
isolationist impulses there was finally the disillusionment following 
in the wake of the First World War, highlighted by the exposures in 
the mid-thirties of the activities of greedy munitions makers. Added 
to all this came the impact of the great depression itself with its 
understandable urge to concentrate attention on the home front 
and, in the words of the new President of the United States, "putting 
first things first." 
In  view of what later happened, Roosevelt's initial attitude is 
important. His true convictions are hard to determine. Scholars 
like Basil Raucli have argued persuasively that he was an inter- 
nationalist at  heart. Others argue with Robert Divine that Roose- 
velt pursued an isolationist policy "out of genuine conviction." Still 
others, like Langer and Gleason, find it impossible to penetrate and 
determine the President's outlook and reasoning. Indications are 
that Roosevelt may have been instinctively internationalist but that 
as an equally instinctive politician he trimmed not only his policies 
but his convictions to the wind. As Hoover's Secretary of State, 
Henry L. Stimson, found to his delight in the winter of 1932 -33, 
Roosevelt took a much more activist and internationalist approach 
to the problem of Japan than could have been expected. On the 
other hand, a belligerent stand with regard to Pacific matters could 
be acceptable even to traditional American isolationists; "It is not 
nearly so dangerous a prospect," the isolationist Seiiator Robert 
Taft was to tell the National Republican Club in 1940, "that we may 
become involved in a war in the Pacific as in the European war." 
I n  late 1934 Roosevelt appeared to have made a genuine attempt to 
win congressional approval for U.S. membership in the World 
Court, only to see the proposal defeated in early 1935. And when 
tlie President later that year wrote his ambassador to Germany 
a personal letter, he couched his words in distinctly isolationist 
terms, "I do not know that the United States can save civilization 
but at  least by our example we can make people think and give 
them the opportunity of saving themselves." 
The important point in this connection, however, is not what 
Roosevelt really thought. Rather, it is tlie impression which he gave 
the American nation. Nothing in Roosevelt's early forcign policy 
indicated bold internationalism. I n  fact, when candidate Roosevelt 
in 1932 renounced the idea 01 American membership in the League 
of Nations to WOO the support of the isolationist newspaper magnate 
William Randolph Hearst, it was an action that soon appeared 
rather in style. The reciprocal trade agreements policy inaugurated 
in 1934, however internationalist in its long-range aims, was caution 
incarnate. Roosevelt's torpedoing of the London International 
Economic Conference in June 1933, however, had been hailed as 
a "new Declaration of Independence." The diplomatic recognition 
of Soviet Russia in 1933 and the Good Neighbor policy toward 
Latin America were not regarded as signs of new internationalism, 
but meant simply that the United States had abandoned a policy of 
involvement for one of normalcy and benign laissez-j'ai~e. 
The President appeared not only to accept the neutrality legisla- 
tion enacted between 1935 and 1937; he actively pushed for it. 
The First Neutrality Act, which created a mandatory embargo on 
implements of war to belligerent parties, was signed by Roosevelt 
on August 31, 1935. I t  was renewed the following year and made 
permanent and expanded in the spring of 1937 when U.S. citizens 
were forbidden to sail on belligerent ships while the President of the 
United States was given wide discretionary powers to stop the export 
of certain materials other than war materials. The 1937 act also 
introduced the "cash and carry" system to avoid American war 
profiteering. Secretary of State Hull had opposed neutrality legisla- 
tion. Roosevelt, however, had discussed taking profits out of war 
with the Nye committee and personally urged its members to 
formulate proposals. The Nye committee had not meant to consider 
neutrality plans until the President had prodded them in that 
direction, the chief investigator of the committee, StephenRauschen- 
bush, informed the State Department in March of 1935. At Chatau- 
qua, in his only foreign policy speech during the 1936 campaign, 
Roosevelt played heavily on the "merchants of death" theme. "We 
must decide which we love more," a supporter had just written him, 
< '  
-dollars or lives." At Chatauqua, the President insisted that "the 
Nation will answer- must answer -'we choose peace.' " 
Important New Deal advisers underlined the impression that 
Roosevelt's administration was indeed more committed to nation- 
alism than to internationalism. Men like Raymond Moley, Rexford 
Tugwell and Donald Richberg were all in favor of what Richberg 
termed "an economic policy of national self-sufficiency." Even 
Secretary of Agriculture Wallace, who in 1934 had chartered a 
middle course between nationalism and internationalism that im- 
pressed Henry L. Stimson greatly, seemed decidedly to prefer the 
former. I n  his pamphlet America Must Choose, Wallace argued that 
sooner or later tariffs must be lowered greatly and international 
trade expanded, but his emphasis in the Department of Agriculture 
was clearly on such a new course-later. 
The cumulative result of all this was the feeling that there had 
emerged an American consensus, shared emphatically by the White 
House, that neutrality was the only acceptable policy. John T. 
Flynn and Charles A. Beard, both liberals and isolationists, were 
convinced that Roosevelt at  this stage was in their camp. Governor 
Landon of Kansas believed by January 1938 that his adversary in 
I the 1936 election was himself largely responsible for bringing 
isolationism to a climax because of his playing around with leftist 
elements. With some exaggeration, but also a substantial element 
of truth, Landon later remarked, "No one was more isolationist 
than Roosevelt in his first administration." In  contrast to the 
' embattled domestic policies of the Roosevelt administration, the 
President's foreign policy was granted considerable goodwill during 
his first period in office- what could be termed Phase One of New 
1 Deal foreign policy. Phase Two began abruptly in the autumn of 1937. No sooner had 
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the isolationist consensus been stabilized than it was superseded by 
violent controversy. During the first phase, the world had witnessed 
German rearmament, Mussolini's invasion of Ethiopia and the 
emerging fascist movement in Spain. I n  July 1937, even more 
ominously, Japan pushed into Northern China, and there were 
signs of an alliance between Tokyo and Berlin in September. Asked 
to dedicate the Outerlink bridge over the mouth of the Chicago 
river, Roosevelt chose the occasion to make what later became 
known as his "Quarantine" speech of October 5, 1937. I n  the midst 
of the isolationist heartland, the President declared that the inter- 
dependence of the world now made isolationism impossible. He 
pointed to a spreading epidemic of world lawlessness, and he asked 
his listeners to note that "when an  epidemic of physical decease 
starts to spread, the community approves and joins in a quarantine 
of the patients in order to protect the spread of the contagion." 
Moving beyond his Chatauqua speech, Roosevelt stated that Ameri- 
ca could no longer remain content to merely hope for peace but 
that it would have to actively engage in the search for it. 
The nation responded to the speech with mixed reactions. Among 
the Washington politicians, however, the response was in the 
opinion of Secretary Hull and presidential adviser Rosenrnan "quick 
and violent -and nearly unanimous. I t  was condemned as warmon- 
gering and saber-rattling." If Roosevelt had erred by boosting the 
isolationist cause during his first administration, it seemed he had 
now overreacted in the opposite direction. The Secretary of State, 
who had not been consulted, believed it had set the internationalist 
cause back at least six months. The speech came at a singularly 
inopportune moment hard 'on the heels of the Supreme Court 
fiasco. The Supreme Court fight had opened a Pandora's box of 
domestic political troubles for the administration; the "quarantine" 
speech had a similar effect in the foreign policy debate. Politics 
would hereafter contaminate foreign and domestic affairs alike. 
Congress had sought to eliminate presidential discretionary 
powers already by the Neutrality Act of 1935, at the apex of Roose- 
velt's isolationism. After 1937, it redoubled its efforts. I n  January 
1938, the administration barely managed to head off passage of the 
Ludlow amendment which proposed to change the U.S. constitu- 
tion so that a declaration of war would become possible only after 
a national referendum-except in case of invasion. The more 
critical the world situation became- and the majority of Americans 
were not fooled by the mood of optimism that swept the continent 
in the wake of Munich- the more determined Congress was to 
restrain the President. Roosevelt's request for a special congressional 
session to repeal the arms embargo after Hitler's invasion of Poland 
in September 1939 met with an uproar. The resulting Neutrality 
Act of 1939 was a compromise that repealed the embargo, but re- 
tained so many restrictions that it was tantamount to one more 
isolationist victory. I t  took a vicious debate before the President's 
request for selective service legislation became law in the autumn of 
1940. Nor did Roosevelt's reelection in 1940 remove the question of 
war and peace from politics. After he had asked Congress to pass the 
Lend-Lease bill in January 1941, Washington, in the words of a 
Herbert Hoover associate, "has forgotten National Unity and is 
engaged in a battle over the Lend-Lease bill, which is surcharged 
with bitterness and explosive invective." Should the United States 
become wrecked as a nation, Senator Arthur Vandenberg wrote in 
his diary, "you can put your finger on this precise moment as the 
time when the crime was committed." While Lend-Lease did be- 
come law on March 11, 1941, it did so over the objections of what 
seemed to be an increasingly frenzied opposition. 
The intense hostility in congressional and Republican circles 
stood in marked contrast to the growing willingness of the American 
people to back Roosevelt's foreign policy. In 1939, Americans for 
the first time had come to regard the question of war and peace as 
more important than employment. That year, a "tremendous 
upsurge" in public sentiment began to favor the cause of the 
western democracies. By September, 62 percent favored a revision 
of the neutrality laws. In  October, a majority of Americans had 
been unwilling to allow the United States to loan money to the 
democracies, but by March of 1940 that, too, had changed. In  the 
middle of that summer, the nation was overwhelmingly for military 
conscription. This was in part a reflection of the nation's "immense 
enthusiasm" for defense by 1939-40. At the time of the Lend- 
Lease proposal, moreover, more than 60 percent of all Americans 
questioned by pollsters favored aiding Britain even at the clear risk 
of war. As one prominent Republican pointed out to another, it 
would be almost impossible to deny Roosevelt the legislation he was 
seeking. 
I t  testifies to the intenseness of their opposition when many 
legislators nevertheless continued to defy the President. By 1939, 
Congress and the nation were parting ways, and the lawmakers 
knew it. "I know that the sentiment of the people of North Carolina 
is for revision of the Neutrality Act," Senator Josiah Bailey wrote in 
September, "but we must not be governed in a matter of this sort 
by public sentiment." Many of those who reluctantly came out in 
favor of the administration's foreign policy did so only out of fear of 
political extinction, a fact that did not lessen their anger. The very 
fact that Americans on the whole were by 1940-41 ready to dis- 
pense with the traditional policy of isolation secmed to spur a 
highly vocal minority into even intensified isolationism such as 
typified by the "America First" movement. 
Those who have criticized Roosevelt for his temerity at  the time, 
pointing to his substantial backing from the nation, have often 
failed to realize the full extent of his predicament. I t  was the antag- 
oriism of this rather minor but select group of opponents that gave 
Roosevelt the feeling, of which he complained in late 1939, that "I 
am almost literally walking on eggs," and which prompted him to 
begin- in Fro-tessor Patterson's phrase -"eating humble pie" in 
order to win a more widespread congressional support for his foreign 
policy. 
The basis of such extraordinary dissent was clearly traditionally 
isolationist-the conviction that in spite of the menacing world 
situation, the United States was not really threatened. I t  followed 
from this that tlie administration's danger ~varnings had to be 
dismissed as warmongering. That, in turn, meant that the real threat 
was domestic more than foreign. Senator SVilliam E. Borah set the 
ratio at  90 percent domestic compared to 10 percent foreign. And 
an Iowa Republican, Verne Marshall, summarized tlie viewpoint: 
"Ours is an  internal crisis, seriously aggravated by external compli- 
cations." Isolationism had never been far removed from party 
politics, and in Congress it turned at  the end of the nineteen thirties 
into partisanship of the highest order, becoming an integral part of 
the crusade against Roosevelt and his New Deal. 
Hn foreign policy matters as in domestic affairs the key word was 
suspicion. Critics of all political persuasions seemed to agree that 
RooseveIt devoted his energies to the manufacture of war clouds. 
His motives, bj- common agreement, were deceptive and political: 
to secure a third term nomination and prolong tlie New Deal. His 
means: the smoke screen of emergency or even actual war. Neither 
did h e r e  seem to be much doubt as to what the President's reasons 
were for his allegedly new foreign policy attitude- troubles at  home. 
Socialist leader Norman Thomas reasoned that the New Deal had 
failed to conquer the problem of poverty and insecurity and was 
taking the nation to war partly to compensate for this failure. The 
Socialist party- and leftist critics like Charles A. Beard- took the 
line that Roosevelt was seeking an escape in a big war trade or 
indeed in warfare. Beard later elaborated upon a Saturdq Evening 
Post editorial which quoted the dying King Henry IV's cynical 
advice to his son: "Be it thy course to busy giddy minds/ With 
foreign quarrels; that action, hence borne out/ May waste the 
memory of the former days." True to his name, Maury Maverick, a 
Texas New Dealer, protested openly, "We Democrats have got to 
admit that we are floundering. The reason for all this battleship and 
war frenzy is coming out: we have pulled all the rabbits out of the 
hat and there are no more rabbits." The conservative approach was 
much the same. General Robert E. Wood, chairman of America 
First, remained convinced that Roosevelt used the war as a way out. 
So was Amos Pinchot, the one-time progressive who in the middle 
thirties had turned conservative with a vengeance. The critics 
seemed to have no doubt but that Roosevelt, after having failed on 
the "low" road to power and prosperity through domestic reforms, 
was by 1937 willing to take the "high" road of international conflict 
to reach the goal. They all kept coming back to it, the editors of the 
Post said about the "quarantine" speech, "because it is the key to 
much of what has happened since." 
What might be called the anti-Roosevelt version of isolationism 
drew nourishment from a number of related concepts and occur- 
rences. Orson Welles' famed 1938 broadcast which purported to 
bring news about a Martian invasion had its peculiar impact also i n  
politics. Roosevelt, according to the critics, was more skilled than 
Welles in creating a scare to give him what he wanted-more 
presidential power. To Norman Thomas, such was logical thinking 
because the very lack of immediate danger from abroad "will make 
it more necessary for artificial propaganda and regimentation too 
maintain the war spirit." When the President declared a national 
emergency in February 1939, this was simply taken as an indication 
"that he is in a bad frame of mind." A characteristically flippant 
remark made by the President upon returning to Washington from 
Warm Springs after a vacation in April 1939 -"I'll be back in the 
fall if we don't have a war"- aroused much speculation. Roosevelt's 
boast from 1935 that contrary to the charges that the New Deal was 
drifting helplessly, each step had a definite relationship to every 
other step "because we planned it that way," now returned to haunt 
him. The implication was, as Frank Knox made clear in his 1938. 
book We Planned It That Way, that the nation's new predicament was 
part of New Deal planning. Critics who had previously refused to 
find consistency in the President's actions were now disposed to 
regard such an idea as gospel truth. 
Throughout his Presidency, Franklin D. Roosevelt had faced 
grave decisions and difficult times, but it seemed as if crisis had 
served only to strengthen the tie between the President and the 
American people. Noting this, Roosevelt's critics were quick to 
confuse necessity with intention, thus reversing cause and effect by 
arguing that there was crisis precisely because the New Deal wanted 
and needed it. I t  was important in this connection that under the 
New Deal, war and reform had been so to speak ideological brothers 
from the outset. Launching his program in 1932, Roosevelt had 
declared it a "call to arms." In his inauguration address he threat- 
ened that he might be forced to ask for powers that matched those 
he would command in case of actual warfare. Indeed, as Professor 
Leuchtenburg has pointed out, the New Deal was resting its case on 
an analogy between depression and wartime emergencies. What 
could be more intrinsically in line with New Deal policy than war? 
Nearly all of Roosevelt's foreign policy critics regarded the Presi- 
dent's personality as the real danger. Even admirers took note of 
Roosevelt's consummate ability to shift the nation's attention from 
one field to another. Most opponents -and many apparent backers 
-seemed to agree with Charles A. Lindbergh that Roosevelt could 
persuade himself that anything he desired would be in the nation's 
interest. Norman Thomas was convinced that there was a relation- 
ship "between Roosevelt's growing Messianic complex and his 
conception of the emergency," although he refrained from saying so 
in public. The Republican party, Alf Landon reported, was being 
pushed into isolationism, "step by step, by the subconscious fear of 
Roosevelt." A chief organizer of the internationalist Willkie move- 
ment, Willard Archie, agreed that there was fear also in his group 
of a President who merely worked on people's feelings and whose 
foreign policy remained always a secret. The crux of the whole 
situation, Herbert Hoover believed, was the profound distrust in 
his successor. He was convinced that if any one of the nation's 
previous 31 presidents had made a request for neutrality revision 
such as Roosevelt did in 1939, the bill would have been passed 
immediately. Together with the opportunities offered by a major 
crisis Roosevelt's alleged extreme opportunism would make an 
explosive combination. 
What seemed to render the destruction of the republic inevitable, 
however, was the widespread conviction that war would by its own 
inexorable logic lead to the death of democracy and replace it with 
dictatorship. I t  was no new concept; in fact, both European and 
American intellectuals had long drawn attention to it. I t  had been 
Werner Sombart's thesis in 1913 that capitalism in its extreme form 
had developed under the impetus of war. Prior to Pearl Harbor, a 
symposium headed by Professor Willard Waller concluded that the 
impact of war on the nation's institutions would be nothing short of 
devastating. Another scholar, FrederickJ. Teggart, pointed out that 
while the "War-State" would be organized for the prosecution of 
war, the reverse would also be true: "In every country the prose- 
cution of -car calis the War-State into being." Bronislaw Malinow- 
ski, the fanled Polish-English ethnologist, told American readers 
that totalitarianism was nothing but the constitution of the nation 
on a wartime basis. But it was an American scholar, Harold Lass- 
well, who addrcsscd himself to the problem in the greatest depth. 
Lasswell's vision was a native American precursor of the "Garrison 
State" as he termed it. In the garrison state, total war had totally 
obscured the traditional difference between a civilian and a military 
sphere ol life. He predicted an energetic struggle, ostensibly in 
behalf of the common man, to incorporate the young and old into 
the mission of the state, singling out in particular the termination 
of unemployment as the most conspicuous form of propaganda to 
coerce the people. Lasswell, in fact, was describing a structure of 
socicty tkar was already regimented and haunted by a huge bureau- 
cracy, although in principle it would retain the outward forms of 
democracy, and the sociologist admitted o ~ e n l y  that his prediction 
was rooted in the contemporary American experience, resting upon 
"the extrapolation of past trends into the future." I t  not only could 
happen here, Lasswell was saying, but it had actually been hzppen- 
ing for some time. 
But America needed no warning from the 'experts.' The totalita- 
rian regimes of the nineteen thirties were seen by a large number of 
observers in the United States as the children of the First World 
War. Out of that war, Missouri Senator Bennett C. Clark warned, 
came Hitler, Stalin and Mussolini. Republican leaders were now 
disposed to agree with Eugene Debs, the Socialist leader, who had 
once lamented that all America got out of that war was influenza 
and the income tax. The political left and right vied with each other 
in portraying the dire consequences of another war that in size and 
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impact was certain to dwarf the first international conllagration. 
Almost unanimously, critics on both sides of the President subscribed 
to the view that U.S. participation in another war would not only be 
ineffective but would guarantee dictatorship in the United States 
overnight. So widespread were such views that, ironically, it is likely 
that Franklin D. Roosevelt privately shared them. War, he told 
Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle, could mean opening a 
Pandora's box that would release forces none of them would under- 
stand. 
The notion that dictatorship had already arrived in the United 
States in a minor way made such viewpoints all the more compelling 
to the opposition. I t  was the dictatorial power that the Lend-Lease 
bill proposed to give to Roosevelt which aroused the fury of his 
opponents, not the principle of aid to Britain, a Republican insider 
observed. During the debate over the bill, conservative Democrats 
charged that the President would actually become an American 
Fuehrer if Lend-Lease became law, and the Republicans termed the 
proposal a streamlined declaration of war. Samuel Crowther, 
writing to other prominent Republicans, expressed his belief that 
Lend-Lease was designed to make a painless transition into that 
condition in which people were the slaves of the State. While there 
were important Republican leaders who feared that Lend-Lease was 
primarily another trick to fool the American taxpayer and in that 
way expand the old New Deal practices by putting all other 
countries on WPA as well, tlie main fear seemed to be the one voiced 
by Senator Vandenberg who felt that Lend-Lease would make 
Roosevelt "the Ace Power Politician of the World and . . . turn the 
White House into G.H.Q. for all tlie wars of all the world." Charles 
Lindbergh believed this was Roosevelt's way of taking the center of 
the world stage away from Kitler. As the Chattanooga News had 
long since pointed out, Roosevelt would not become a dictator un- 
less war came, hut Lend-Lease seemed in the eyes of the sceptics to 
bridge the gap from peace to wartime and hence make reginienta- 
tion certain. 
While there was general agrcement among the critics that Mars 
would be the midwife of the new revolution, they were characte- 
ristically uncertain about its direction. Both sides agreed that it 
would entail all-out government control and nationalization of key 
industries as well a.s regimentation of labor. But the left was just 
as certain that the label that had to be affixed to the new order was 
Fascism as the right was convinced it had to be Socialism. One of the 
most influential analysts was Raymond Moley, a chief Roosevelt 
aide during his first term and later an important critic. Moley took 
a less ideologically committed view about the prospects. The New 
Dealers, he reasoned, would claim that to fight Hitler's movement, 
"which they call a world revolution, we shall need a counter- 
revolution. Not being very original or subtle people, they interpret 
such a counter-revolution as the exact opposite of Nazism- which 
is Communism, under another name, of course-and therefore we 
get the British Labor Party idea of a world cooperating common- 
wealth." Essentially, Moley believed the result would be an attempt 
to establish "throughout the world a still more radical New Deal, 
and as we have learned from our experience with the New Deal, it 
is something that needs to be supported by capitalistic money." 
Just as the New Deal was expected to be at heart either communis- 
tic, socialistic or fascist- and the American people, typified by 
Senator Harry S. Truman in 1941, did not find any major difference 
between them-it followed by applying the same logic in reverse 
that whatever -ism came out victorious in a world war it would also 
in large measure be a New Deal victory. The revolution emerging 
from a conflagration, in other words, would be an extended Roose- 
velt revolution. 
Events in 1941 appeared to confirm such suspicions. When the 
President on May 27 proclaimed that a state of unlimited national 
emergency existed, this was interpreted as the climax of eight years 
of political extravagance. The following day, Secretary Ickes was 
named petroleum coordinator for national defense and thus 
succeeded, Rebublican leaders noted, in establishing precisely that 
control over the oil industry which the New Deal had sought in vain 
since it came into power. The only hope which Moley could offer 
his fellow sceptics was that while Roosevelt was by now sure to have 
an even greater variety of powers than President Wilson had had 
in the midst of World War I, there was always a chance that the 
President might forget some of them. At a time when the New Deal 
was ostensibly on the wane, the theme of Army and Navy Journal 
editor John O'Laughlin's informed and perceptive letters to GOP 
leaders was rather the triumphant New Deal revolution. He ob- 
served: "The out and out New Dealers are in the saddle, and they 
are using their power with the same zest they have exercised in 
the past." 
The ascension of Harlan F. Stone to the position of Chief Justice 
of the United States became interpreted as a sign that the New Deal 
by June of 1941 had assumed control over all three branches of the 
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government- even though Stone was known as a moderate and had 
been elevated to the highest court by Calvin Coolidge in 1925. As 
was known in congressional circles, Roosevelt at this stage enter- 
tained the hope that he could retain the services of Thomas J. 
Corcoran, reputed to be one of the most dedicated but also one of 
the most Macchiavellian of the New Dealers. House Speaker 
Rayburn, however, vetoed a presidential suggestion that Corcoran 
be made Solicitor General in August 1941. Also, it had become clear 
that the members of the Supreme Court were divided on the matter. 
But if Roosevelt was forced to reluctantly part with Corcoran, lie 
did not bid farewell to Harry Hopkins, the former WPA admini- 
strator and Secretary of Commerce, who even more than Corcoran 
had antagonized sections of the Democratic party in 1940. In 
January 1941 Roosevelt made Hopkins his special messenger to 
Britain and later in the year officially designated him Special 
Assistant to the President. From then on and for the duration of the 
war, Hopkins served as Roosevelt's daily companion with a resi- 
dence in the southwestern corner of the second floor of the White 
House itself. Even New Dealers now began to complain that every- 
thing had to seep through Hopkins in order to reach the President. 
Talk about the evil influence of this American 'Rasputin' abounded. 
To John Pritchard, Hopkins became the very symbol of New Deal 
11. 
Such attitudes made it plausible to regard war as the conscious 
or near-conscious culmination of the New Deal- and vice versa. 
The amazing thing was not that the notion was conceived, but that 
it was so widely shared among Roosevelt's critics. I t  was Senator 
Burton K. JVheeler, the old progressive from Montana, who provid- 
ed the most devastating suggestion of a link between the admini- 
stration's new foreign policy and the New Deal of old by attacking 
Lend-Lease as "the New Deal's Triple A foreign policy; it will plow 
under every fourth American boy.'' More conservative voices like 
Bruce Barton, a Republican leader, proclaimed the establishment of 
the Tokyo-Berlin axis in the summer of 1940 as the New Deal's 
final triumph. And Senator Robert A.Taft, the conservative Repub- 
lican from Ohio, stated in the same vein that "Entrance into the 
European war will be the next great New Deal experiment." More 
than that, such views were also privately and generally shared in 
congressional circles. As early as at the end of 1938, it was reliably 
reported that the more conservative Democrats, "including the 
V[ice] PLresident], and practically all of the Republicans, are sug- 
gesting that Roosevelt has taken the road to war in order that he 
may perpetuate himself in power." On October 24, 1941, eighteen 
Republican congressmen met secretly in the Willard Hotel in 
Washington to debate the problem of hTendell Willkie. All of them 
agreed, it was reported confidentially to ex-President Hoover, that 
the administration's foreign policy sprang directly from his domestic 
policy. Moreover, "they all had a deep-seated conviction that the 
administration was concerned with war not as war but as a method 
of destroying the present form of government in the United States." 
The Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, 
produced instant unity among all warring political factions in the 
' United States. The red-hot irons of Mars seemed to have sutured 
the wounds of the past. Fear and even uncertainty drowned in a 
torrent of rightful indignation. The editors of Time pointed to a 
nation "in a state of granite certainty.'' Newsweek was amazed at  
the speed with which the internal discussions had been wiped out. 
1 Interventionist, isolationist, Republican, Democrat- those were all 
I 
names which in the opinion of U.S. News had vanished in Pearl 
Harbor's smoke. Columnist James Reston told the readers of the 
New York Times that, almost miraculously, the deep divisions that 
had marked the nation's entrance into the wars of 1776, 18 12, 186 1, 
1898 and 1917 were all absent. Indeed, on his sixtieth birthday on 
January 30, 1942, Franklin 19. Roosevelt found himself at the high- 
est point of public confidence since he took office in 1933, 72 percent 
of the pecple had backed their President immediately prior to the 
outbreak of the Pacific war, but by January the percentage had 
reached 84 and was still rising. Chicago police arrested young 
Edwin A. Loss, Jr. when he booed a sound movie showing the 
President, and before the judge fined him $ 200 which was the 
maximum for disorderly conduct, the youngster explained that he 
did not realize what he had been doing. When unity finally arrived, 
it did so- it appeared- with a vengeance. 
Both inside and outside of Congress, thc nation's politicians 
revealed every intention of foregoing traditional politics. "There are 
I no party lines today in Congress," it was noted after a state of war 
had been declared. "There are no blocs, no cliques, no factions. 
The house-divided-within-itself has ceased to exist in Wasliington." 
On December 10, Ed Flynn in his capacity as chairman of the 
Democratic National Committee wired his Republican counterpart 
Joseph Martin, asking for a complete moratorium on politics. Flynn 
suggested that the two agencies instead of being used for partisan 
advantage should be made available for the President for national 
defense. Martin responded favorably, if cautiously, saying that as 
before the GOP would not allow politics to enter into national 
defense matters. Roosevelt quickly moved in to seal the agreement, 
thanking the two organizations for their truce which he described as 
being for the duration of the emergency. The outcome was described 
as the most complete adjournment of politics since the formation of 
the two-party system. 
But in fact nothing could have been more deceptive than the show 
of unity during the first months after December 7, 1941. Real unity 
ended, as it began, with Pearl Harbor. The war situation and Roose- 
velt's popularity made open opposition suicidal for his detractors. 
While they officially joined the chorus of non-partisanship, they 
were privately unreconstructed. The Socialists, Norman Thomas 
admitted, were simply biding their time. He did support the Presi- 
dent of the United States, Charles Lindbergh reasoned, but he had 
no confidence at all in Roosevelt. Lindbergh sided with a large 
group of America Firsters who favored adjourning the activities of 
the organization rather than dissolving it. Hoover and Landon 
remained as profoundly distrustful of their old adversary: 'yust 
remember," Landon warned a friend one week after Pearl Harbor, 
"that once a boondoggler always a boondoggler." Outwardly calm 
and cooperative, most congressional Republicans and many Demo- 
crats were privately helplessly furious. 
The much-heralded removal of party politics by itself gave many 
Republican leaders cause for alarm. GOP chairman Martin had 
been taken by surprise by Flynn's initiative, but even so his reply 
was simply a reiteration of his pledge from 1940 to keep politics- 
meaning no doubt New Deal politics- out of the defense effort. The 
sceptics now interpreted Roosevelt's moratorium on politics as a 
shrewd attempt to silence the opposition and establish a one-party 
government. I t  was the disappearance of politics and an overdose 
of unity, GOP publicity director Clarence Kelland declared on 
February 12, 1942, which in the past had produced the oppressive 
regimes in Germany, Italy and Japan. By the middle of February, 
the Republican party had decided that its main task, rather than 
indulge in patriotism, would be to "proclaim the necessity of 
politics." 
One chief reason for the almost instant return of politics after 
Pearl Harbor was the simple fact that, unlike in Britain where 
elections had been postponed until after the war, the democratic 
processes would run their normal course in the United States. With 
34 senators and all 435 members of the House of Representatives up  
for election in November 1942 politics was unavoidable. As U.S. 
News put it, "A Congress with the biggest job of any in history has 
collided with an election year." Both sides were jockeying for posi- 
tions. Roosevelt might talk to his aide William Hassett about the 
evils of politics in wartime and dwell upon the unfortunate political 
maneuvers during the Civil War in particular, but even his rather 
perfunctory involvement in the gubernatorial battle in New York 
was interpreted as a sure sign of greater presidential ambitions. 
The contest was not only between the Democratic element and the 
Republican group which was headed by Thomas E. Dewey, the 
ultimate winner and presidential aspirant, but also between pro- 
and anti-Roosevelt factions- the latter with Jack Bennett as their 
candidate. Former Governor A1 Smith saw it as "Roosevelt's 
beginning of a fight for a fourth term for himself" rather than an 
attempt to simply replace Bennett with Senator James M. Mead, 
a Roosevelt backer. Victory for the Roosevelt forces was believed to 
have enormous long-range consequences. "Maybe that is our 
destiny," the New York Dailj News pondered; "Maybe we are fated 
to change from republicanism to Caesarism." 
I t  was, in fact, less of a return to normal politics than it was a 
recoil to the special high-intensity debate that had characterized 
the pre-war situation. As the statements by Smith and the Daih 
News indicate, the fears and suspicions regarding the New Deal 
remained unabated. Once aroused, they sustained in an important 
minority in Washington a climate of opinions that made the idea of 
a "New Deal of War" appear as convincing after December 1941 as 
prior to it. 
Contrary to what the New York Times was saying, Pearl Harbor 
had not completely exploded the myth that Roosevelt had sought to 
trick the nation into war. What convinced the vast majority of 
Americans served only to strengthen the suspicioi~s of the irrecon- 
cilable~. The Japanese attack seemed too perfectly suited to rallying 
the nation behind a declaration of war. To offset such thinking, the 
President had appointed a commission headed by Supreme Court 
Justice Owen Roberts, no ardent backer of the New Deal, to investi- 
gate the circumstances of the attack. On  January 24, 1942, the 
commission reported its findings which were later corroborated by 
the historians: the administration could not be blamed. Instead, 
the Roberts commission criticized Admiral H. E. Kimmel and 
General W. C. Short, the military area commanders involved. On 
February 28, it was announced that a court martial was in progress, 
although both officers were allowed to retire shortly thereafter. 
Such actions were not sufficient to dispel the accumulated animosi- 
ties, however. The opposition had, in fact, foreseen the possibility 
of a "war-making incident," but in the autumn of 1941 believed 
that the American people would understand that it was the result 
of presidential machinations. On November 14, 1941, both Alf 
Landon and Norman Thomas spoke in almost identical words 
about the extreme bitterness of the common man when he found 
out that he had been tricked into the war. On December 11, two 
days after the attack, 20 of the 28 Senate Republicans met for 
a private conference which ended in a unanimous pledge of support 
in the war effort. What was not known at the time was that after a 
debate which turned around the issue of Pearl Harbor for nearly two 
hours, tempers ran so high that only at the last minute was it agreed 
to delete a phrase in the final resolution which would have amount- 
ed to a vicious indictment of the President. There were reports that 
Roosevelt was being shockingly abused even by former backers in 
the Middle West because of the belief that the war had been engi- 
neered by the White House. 
Whether or not Roosevelt's opponents continued to subscribe to 
the view that the administration had made use of the war as a 
political weapon even to the point of involving the nation in actual 
warfare, they seemed entirely convinced that the President was 
determined to utilize the war situation once it had materialized as 
a shield for his reform schemes. JVar controls, it was contended, 
might well become the basis for a "Super-New Deal"; what the 
reformers had been denied in peacetime could now be pushed 
through in the name of national security. In  an attack on the Board 
of Economic Warfare in the spring of 1942, the New York Journal- 
American asked warfare against whom and against what? "Is it 
warfare against the traditional 150-year old American economic 
way? . . . Is it a WAR or a REVOLUTION that is going on in the 
United States?" The battle that raged over the Office of Civilian 
Defense in early 1942 underlined the same points. The OCD, which 
was co-directed by Mayor Fiorello La-Guardia and Eleanor Roose- 
velt, seemed to epitomize the view that Congresswoman Caroline 
O'Day had voiced in 1940 : "Our social program is as much a part 
of national defense as our arms." On  the theory that real defense 
had to be based on individuals having confidence in themselves, 
Mrs. Roosevelt encouraged physical fitness courses that provoked 
administration detractors just as much as the hiring by the OCD of 
presumed leftists. The agency's director, James M.Landis, protested 
that his was not a "social reform organization," but to the opposi- 
tion the QCD was "just another sample of the way the New Deal 
operates." 
The belief that there was what Alf Landon privately termed a 
"New Deal First" movement concerned many of Roosevelt's 
opponents to the point of obsession. With Samuel Crowther, they 
believed they were "in the grip of war and social theory." As 
Senator Ralph 0. Brewster, a Maine Republican, saw it in 1943, 
"This is not fighting a war. It's pushing an ideology- the very 
ideology, as a matter of fact, that we are fighting with guns at 
the front." Roosevelt's wartime Secretary of Commerce, Jesse M. 
Jones, was convinced that the President was fighting two wars at the 
same time-one military and one political. The real enemy in the 
eyes of the administration, Alf Landon charged, was not Hitler but 
the wicked capitalist system. There was a significant small number 
of people, Roosevelt retorted privately, that would rather nail his 
hide to the barn door than win the war. One successful Republican 
office-seeker even boasted openly that he had gone after the Presi- 
dent with as much venom as if there had been no war. Indeed, 
Herbert Hoover was told in 1942, "we find a purpose, not merely a 
disposition as in the past, to embarass and heckle the President." 
The result was far-reaching. In  nearly all other nations, the com- 
ing of the war had produced political cooperation in the face of 
external danger. In the United States, too, the effect of World War 
I1 was politically soothing to some extent, at least on the surface and 
in the nation as a whole. In  Washington, however, rather than 
obliterate the political tension the war intensified it. Out of it came 
nothing less than a "war within the war." Both participants in the 
feuds and later historians have used the words "civil war'' to describe 
the situation. "I regret to say," Federal Reserve chairman at  the 
time, Marriner S. Eccles, said in looking back, for example, "that 
each of us who served in Washington during 1940- 45 fought a civil 
war within an international one." No doubt the war would end 
some day, Under Secretary of Commerce Will Clayton wrote a 
conservative friend in July of 1943, but the battle of Washington 
c c  perhaps never." Small wonder that Max Lerner at the end of that 
year- as Roosevelt was returning from Teheran after discussions 
about a second front against the Axis-could observe somewhat 
despairingly: "The President has come back to his own Second 
Front. We shall need to build another bridge of fire, not to link in 
with our Allies but to unite us with ourselves, and to span the fissures 
within our own national will." 
MTithin less than two months after Pearl Harbor, past and present 
thus merged in American politics. The sheer longevity of the Roose- 
velt administration, the fear of its "real" aims coupled with resent- 
ment over its actual achievements, the creation- particularly after 
1936-of what seemed to be more of a New Deal party than the 
traditional Democratic party- all this was further aggravated in the 
eyes of Roosevelt's opponents by a war which was in their view at 
best one that would incidentally promote the kind of society the 
New Dealers had tried in vain to bring about in peacetime and 
which was at worst one that liad actively been engineered for that 
purpose by a reckless aspirant for dictatorial power in the White 
House. The activism of Roosevelt and his chief lieutenants and 
agencies during the war itself intensified the crusade against the 
New Deal and made it part of a war within the war. Yet even 
without that activism, the "New Deal of War" concept went a long 
way toward making something akin to a political civil war un- 
avoidable. As one prominent Republican put it during World War 
11, the wartime crop of "dragon's teeth" had been planted during 
the years of Roosevelt's peacetime "trickery." 
NOTE 
This article is scheduled to appear in substantially the same form in the 
author's forthcoming book on the eclipse of the New Deal, 1940- 1945, to be 
published by Alfred A. Knop Publishers of New York. For this reason, it has 
been deemed superfluous to include here the 180 sometimes extensive footnotes 
to the original text. 
